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THE LATE, GREAT
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
James M. Underwoodt
I. INTRODUCTION
"Every dream is a prophecy....
Sometimes the best and even most popular predictions come up
short, particularly when founded on desire rather than observation. A
somewhat notorious recent example concerned the 1970 publication
of Hal Lindsey's apocalyptic work entitled "The Late, Great Planet
Earth." Dubbed by the New York Times as the "non-fiction bestseller
of the decade,"2 and with sales of over fifteen million copies, this
book generally viewed the Bible's book of Revelation as literally true
and asserted that the world might come to an end in 1988-forty
years from the creation of the modern State of Israel.3 To the relief of
the majority of the world's citizens, this time of judgment did not
come to pass, although such prognostications certainly added drama
to that decade.
Prophecies exist in the legal world, too. In the area of federal
courts, the last few decades witnessed an escalating call for the aboli-
tion of diversity jurisdiction along with predictions of its impending
demise.4 Diversity jurisdiction, of course, generally permits civil liti-
gants having different citizenships to have their disputes adjudicated
in federal court so long as the claims are big enough--even in the
absence of any federal cause of action. This form of subject matter
t Assistant Professor, Baylor University Law School.
I GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE BODLEY HEAD BERNARD SHAW: COLLECTED PLAYS
WITH THEIR PREFACES, VOL. 2 (Dan H. Laurence ed., 1971), available at http://www.bartleby.
com/66/32/53532.html.
2 Amazon.com, Late Great Planet Earth, Editorial Reviews, http:llwww.amazon.comlgp/
product/031027771X/ref=ase..peterehatta/104-2418120-7831 (last visited May 10, 2006).
3 See generally Wikipedia.con, The Late, Great Planet Earth, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wikifrhe_Late_GreatPlanetEarth (last visited May 10, 2006).
4 See infra Part II.C.
5 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) provides that federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction
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jurisdiction has been around since the first Judiciary Act of 17896 and
has seen its popularity, among federal judges and other members of
the legal profession, wax and wane over the last two centuries. Since
the inception of the twentieth century, however, diversity jurisdiction
has increasingly come under attack.7 In general, its critics have urged
that diversity jurisdiction is an anachronistic enemy of federalism that
fills the increasingly crowded federal courts with state law claims that
are not tremendously important. 8 This assault reached a climax in
1990 when the important Federal Courts Study Committee released
its report concluding that diversity jurisdiction should generally be
eliminated.9 Despite such apocalyptic-like calls for the legislative
abandonment of any federal court role in state law civil disputes, the
demise of this doctrine-much like Lindsey's prediction for the im-
minent end of the world-has been erroneously forecast. Almost as
soon as the report came out, Congress ignored the primary recom-
mendation and, in three respects, began to legislatively expand diver-
sity jurisdiction in unprecedented ways. These last two decades-in
particular, the last few years-have thus witnessed not only a rejec-
tion by Congress of the calls for limiting diversity jurisdiction but an
unprecedented expansion of the tenet. Most importantly, Congress
has legislated in a way that should remove from the diversity jurisdic-
tion debate the shackles of concern over the framers' original inten-
tions in crafting this form of jurisdiction for the federal courts.
This article offers an overview of the historical views of diversity
jurisdiction, an exploration of the last two volatile decades in which
diversity jurisdiction has once again risen to potent new heights, and a
consideration of the implications of this fundamental shift for future
possible advances in federal court adjudication of certain state law
claims. The three areas in which Congress has seen fit to not only
reaffirm the viability of diversity but to actually expand its use are
(i) supplemental jurisdiction, 10 (ii) certain mass torts," and (iii) class
action reform. 12 By ignoring the "prophetic" calls for the demise of
over civil claims exceeding the "sum or value of $75,000 ... and is between (1) citizens of
different States .... "
6 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-79 (1789).
7 See infra Part Il.B.2.
8 See ERwiN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 288 (3d ed. 1999).
9 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE 39-40 (1990) (concluding that
"[in most diversity cases ... there is no substantial need for a federal forum") [hereinafter
Study Committee Report].
10 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
1 28 U.S.C. § 1369(2000).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2000).
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diversity, Congress has taken seriously some of the pitfalls of modem
day, state court litigation and opted for a federal forum for many state
law disputes where federal jurisdiction arguably makes more sense
than ever before. This article does not attempt as its primary goal to
editorialize on whether Congress should, or should not, exercise its
political and legislative prerogative to shift certain cases from state to
federal courts. Even so, this article observes that Congress' actions do
constitute an appropriate use of the broad grant of diversity litigation
contemplated by the U.S. Constitution, regardless of whether such
measures have any relation to the original founders' motivations. Ac-
cordingly, other possibilities exist for Congress to continue to flex its
legislative muscle and bestow federal courts with increased diversity
powers in the future.
II. THE HISTORY OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
A. The Origin of Species
One cannot appreciate diversity's present nor contemplate its fu-
ture without understanding its past. Diversity jurisdiction was the
subject of vigorous debates at the inception of the federal court sys-
tem: 13 "The diversity jurisdiction was the object of attack during the
ratification debates, and, in the view of one historian, 'the most as-
tounding thing ... is not the vigor of the attack but the apathy of the
defense.''14 Diversity jurisdiction was contained in the "Virginia
Plan" advocated by the Federalists and ultimately incorporated into
Article II of the Constitution ratified by the states. 15 Because Arti-
cle I only permitted Congress to create "inferior" federal courts, the
grant of diversity jurisdiction in Article 111 required congressional
action to be implemented. After continued haggling between the Fed-
eralists and the Anti-Federalists, 16 the First Congress finally acted in
1789 with the creation of federal trial courts and the authorization of
those courts to exercise general diversity jurisdiction in civil suits
13 See Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the
Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1671 (1992).
14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23 at 142 (5th ed. 1994) (quot-
ing Henry Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 487
(1928)).
15 See generally Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Renoval, 53 CATH. U. L.
REV. 609, 613-17 (2004). Haiber's article contains one of the best discussions concerning the
history of this form of jurisdiction, particularly in the context of removal premised upon diver-
sity of citizenship and noting the courts' growing reluctance to exercise jurisdiction in such
cases liberally.
16 See generally Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789,37 HARv. L. REV. 49 (1923).
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between citizens of different states. 17 Some of the most cited justifica-
tions for the original grant of diversity jurisdiction included the con-
cepts of (a) protecting, generally, out-of-state litigants from the bias
of state court judges and juries and (b) protecting business and credi-
tor interests:
Supporters of a strong federal judiciary... specifically sup-
ported the inclusion of diversity jurisdiction in Article III, as
a means of addressing the problem of local prejudice. Madi-
son, for example, argued that "a strong prejudice may arise,
in some states, against the citizens of others, who may have
claims against them." Hamilton similarly argued that cases
between citizens of different states should be assigned to a
federal court "likely to be impartial between the different
states and their citizens, and which, owing to its official exis-
tence to the union, will never be likely to feel any bias inaus-
picious to the principles on which it is founded." Nor was it
irrational for participants in pre-ratification debates to enter-
tain fears regarding either the reliability or impartiality of
state courts. Indeed, under the Articles of Confederation,
some state courts simply declined to enforce federal admi-
ralty decisions. State courts, particularly those in the South,
were also notoriously hostile to out-of-state creditors.
18
While actual bias against non-local citizens or against creditors and
other commercial interests may have supported diversity jurisdiction
in the minds of some,' 9 Justice Marshall has provided the most defen-
sible and enduring historical argument for this form of jurisdiction:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states
will administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to
parties of every description, it is no less true that the constitu-
tion itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or
17 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-79 (1789).
1S Haiber, supra note 15, at 614-15 (citations omitted).
19 Not all historical commentators are in agreement that bias against nonlocal citizens was
important in the minds of the first Congress:
[Slome commentators-most notably the late Judge Henry Friendly--challenged
this rationale for diversity jurisdiction.... Judge Friendly offered an alternative ex-
planation for the authorization for diversity jurisdiction. Judge Friendly argued that
there was fear of populist state legislatures adopting antibusiness laws; federal court
jurisdiction and the development of federal common law rules provided protection
for interstate commerce and business . . . . Additionally, Friendly contended that
there was fear that state judges who lacked life tenure would be more likely to be in-
fluenced by populist sentiments and be biased against merchants.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 286.
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views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehen-
sion of suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the
decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or be-
tween citizens of different states.2
Thus, for Justice Marshall, the most important rationale behind diver-
sity jurisdiction was for creating the appearance of a rational and
even-handed judicial decision-maker when civil disputes existed be-
tween citizens of different states or countries.
Of course, the only opinion regarding the purpose behind diversity
jurisdiction that actually counts belongs to the Supreme Court.2 1 That
Court has recently reaffirmed the traditional view of the primary, his-
torical purpose underlying diversity jurisdiction. In Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Services Inc.,22 a decision concerning the interpre-
tation of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the Court stated that the
purpose behind the original grant of diversity jurisdiction was "to
provide a federal forum for important disputes where state courts
might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-state litigants.,,23 This
picture painted by the Supreme Court for the role of diversity jurisdic-
tion24 plays an important role in understanding the significance of
events that have transpired during the last two decades.25
Not only was diversity jurisdiction embraced from the inception of
this country's founding, it was actually the primary form of federal
trial court jurisdiction at the time because Congress had not author-
ized federal question jurisdiction. It was not until the post-Civil War
world of 1875 that Congress first permitted federal trial courts to ex-
20 Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
21 Others' views do inform scholars on diversity debates, of course. For example, Profes-
sor Bassett challenges the traditional view of diversity's original purpose, contending that there
is no adequate empirical evidence of what was on the founders' minds when they included a
diversity provision in the Article In grant of jurisdiction. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden
Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 119, 120-36 (2003). Professor Bassett does not
really offer an alternative view of the founders' intent. The primary thrust of her article is to
attack the continued viability of this type of jurisdiction based upon her belief that diversity
jurisdiction expresses a bias against rural communities.
22 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
23 Id. at 2618. See also Bassett, supra note 21, at 123 (noting "[t]wo major theories oc-
cupy the consensus positions as to the historical purpose of diversity jurisdiction, both originat-
ing with the same general concept--that of local bias or prejudice").
24 Exxon's articulation of diversity's purpose, while significant, is simply the most recent
exposition by the Supreme Court on the topic. The Supreme Court has iterated a similar purpose
for diversity in the past as well. See, e.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 354 (1855)
(noting that diversity jurisdiction was intended "to make the people think and feel, though
residing in different States of the Union, that their relations to each other were protected by the
strictest justice, administered in courts independent of all local control or connection with the
subject-matter of the controversy between the parties to a suit").
25 See discussion infra Part Ill.
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ercise general federal question subject matter jurisdiction through the
enactment of what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1331.26 The post-war era in-
volved a time of significant congressional activity that cried out for
jurisdiction in the federal courts:
With the enormous growth in federal law following the Civil
War-a result both of the needs of a growing national econ-
omy and expanded conceptions of the power of the federal
government vis-a-vis the states-the arrangements set as of
1789 were destined to change. A system of federal law adju-
dication lodged primarily in the state courts placed too great a
supervisory responsibility on the Justices of the Supreme
Court. Congress' decision in 1875 to vest the federal courts
with original general federal question jurisdiction reduced the
Court's task to somewhat more manageable proportions by
ensuring that federal law would develop in tribunals accus-
tomed to such questions and whose members would be par-
ticularly sensitive to supervisory signals from the Court.27
In any event, for this country's first century of existence, the federal
courts' primary business was adjudication of state law claims involv-
ing diverse litigants. During that century, this situation created the
historically ironic circumstance 28 in which the federal trial courts
"had jurisdiction-albeit concurrent--over state law claims when the
parties held diverse citizenship whereas original jurisdiction over
what we now refer to as federal question cases was vested exclusively
in the state courts, subject to review by the Supreme Court."29
26 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (current version 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2000)).
27 LINDA J. SILBERMAN & ALLAN R. STEIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 382 (2001) (citing Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts,
53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 158 (1953) ("[T]he exercise of federal question jurisdiction by lower
federal tribunals presumably permits the Supreme Court to confine itself (insofar as any such
distinction can be drawn) to the solving of new problems rather than the policing of old solu-
tions, without the loss that might otherwise be entailed in the effectuation of national rights.")).
28 One scholar offered as a possible post hoc rationalizing principle behind the apparent
irony that there was less concern over state court prejudice in resolving federal claims because
of the belief that federal question cases were more likely to raise questions of law that could be
dealt with on appeal to the Supreme Court whereas diversity cases involved important fact
finding that might be undermined by trial court bias. See James H. Chadboum & A. Leo Levin,
Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 641 (1942). See also
Sloviter, supra note 13, at 1672 n. 4.
29 Sloviter, supra note 13, at 1672. Judge Sloviter referred to this as a rather "unusual al-
location of' federal resources. Id. at 1671.
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B. The Rise and Fall of Diversity
1. Embrace of Diversity Removals
The reception of federal courts to exercising the diversity jurisdic-
tion granted to them by Article LII and the diversity statute during our
country's first century was largely positive. This attitude is best illus-
trated by the federal courts' jurisprudence in two diversity-related
areas: (1) cases removed from state to federal court based upon diver-
sity jurisdiction,30 and (2) the court-created doctrine of fraudulent
joinder as an exception to the complete diversity requirement.3' The
removal context is a particularly good perspective to employ in taking
a closer look at the attitude of federal courts toward diversity because
it involves a situation where the litigants have manifested inconsistent
and antagonistic preferences for forum choice.
One can witness a demonstration of the federal courts' historic
embrace of their diversity jurisdiction in their liberal construction of
the removal statutes. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
federal courts construed a defendant's right to remove a case to fed-
eral court on diversity grounds in a way that resulted in a de facto
enlargement of their exercise of diversity jurisdiction. As one legal
historian has observed:
[F]or roughly a century after Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, most
federal courts treated removal as a necessary procedural
mechanism affording defendants an equal opportunity with
plaintiffs to select a federal forum. Removal merely provided
"an indirect mode" for a federal court to exercise diversity ju-
risdiction, thereby implementing the Constitution's vision of
federal jurisdiction.
This is not to suggest that federal courts ignored the re-
quirements of the removal statutes. But when applying those
statutes, courts focused on fundamental questions of jurisdic-
tion, not procedural niceties-substance, not form.
... Prior to the Civil War, neither Congress nor the federal
courts treated removal as a pernicious or dangerous device
that needed restraint. To the contrary, federal courts inter-
30 See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-47 (2000).
31 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (holding that the diversity
statute requires all plaintiffs to be diverse from each defendant).
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preted removal statutes liberally, while Congress authorized
the expanded use of removal for special cases.
32
Further demonstrating this pro-diversity attitude, the Supreme Court
made it clear that a defendant's right to remove stood on par with a
plaintiff's autonomy to make the initial forum selection:
One great object in the establishment of the Courts of the
United States and regulating their jurisdiction was, to have a
tribunal in each state, presumed to be free from local influ-
ence; and to which all who were nonresidents or aliens might
resort for legal redress. But this object would be defeated, if a
state judge, in the exercise of his discretion, may deny, to the
party entitled to it, a removal of his cause.33
Federal courts were not the only institution to display an eager atti-
tude during the nineteenth century for exercising diversity jurisdic-
tion. Congress also got into the act by experimenting for a short time
with legislative changes to the removal statutes to increase removal
jurisdiction. For example, during Reconstruction, Congress enacted
the Removal Act of 1875 that, among other things, permitted plain-
tiffs (in addition to defendants) to remove cases and also permitted
defendants sued in their home state to remove the case to federal
court.34 The courts continued to embrace their diversity jurisdiction
by tolerating defendants' mistakes in invoking the removal jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts:
In interpreting the removal statutes as amended by these acts,
federal courts continued to reflect Justice Story's view that
removal was a procedural mechanism intended to ensure that
plaintiffs and defendants had equal opportunities to invoke
the original jurisdiction of the federal courts .... In keeping
with the remedial purpose of removal statutes, courts often
excused defects in technical matters of removal procedure,
32 Haiber, supra note 15, at 618-20.
33 Gordon v. Longest, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 97, 104 (1842); See also e.g., Case of Sewing Ma-
chine Cos., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 553, 573 (1873) (holding that a defendant's right to remove is
equivalent to that of the "plaintiff, when he institutes his suit, [and] may elect in which of the
two concurrent jurisdictions he prefers to go to trial").
34 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, 471 (1875) (current version 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (2000). In Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 204 (1877), the Supreme
Court observed, with regard to this legislation, that it had resulted in some "radical changes" in
removal jurisdiction. Ten years later, perhaps due to the exploding federal court dockets, Con-
gress revised the removal statutes again, depriving both plaintiffs and local defendants of any
right to remove. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553 (1887) (as corrected by Act
of Aug. 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433 (1888) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000)).
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even when those [defects] went to matters arguably
determinative of federal jurisdiction. This is demonstrated by
a federal court's explanation of its decision allowing a
defendant to amend a removal petition to add jurisdictional
allegations.
Another illustrative area, albeit also related to removal practice,
where federal courts displayed their historic enthusiasm for diversity
jurisdiction was in the creation of the "fraudulent joinder" doctrine.
Fraudulent joinder is an exception to the complete diversity require-
ment of the diversity statute. In the very early nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court had ruled that Congress intended for § 1332's grant of
diversity jurisdiction to apply only when all of the plaintiffs were
diverse from each and every defendant-a requirement of "complete
diversity. 36 Given the purpose behind this statute, such a rule of con-
struction should neither be viewed as reflecting any anti-diversity
attitude nor of recognizing any constitutional limit on Article 111's
diversity grant, but rather simply as a recognition of the limited extent
of diversity Congress sought to bestow upon the federal trial courts. 37
As a result of this interpretation of § 1332, however, shrewd plain-
tiffs' attorneys began to name as additional defendants in their law-
suits local citizens of the same state as the plaintiff in order to destroy
complete diversity and eliminate the target defendant's right to oth-
erwise remove the case to federal court.38 Recognizing that such a
35 Haiber, supra note 15, at 621 (citations omitted). Professor Haiber offers the following
examples supporting his historical conclusion:
Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1885) (stating that the time limit on removal
could be waived by the plaintiff because "it is not, in its nature, a jurisdictional
matter, but a mere rule of limitation"); Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457, 478 (1879)
(unverified petition excused); Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 86 U.S. 214, 224 (1873) ("The
[removal] statute is remedial, and must be construed liberally."); Harris v. Delaware
& L & W. R. Co., 18 F. 833, 836 (D. N.J. 1884) (finding that neither a "perfect"
petition nor a bond is required for removal; such matters are only matters of practice,
not jurisdictional requirements).
Id. at 621 n. 96.
36 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
37 In Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 1255 S. Ct. at 2618, the Supreme Court ex-
plained the analytical justification for the complete diversity requirement of § 1332 as follows:
The Court, nonetheless, has adhered to the complete diversity rule in light of the
purpose of the diversity requirement, which is to provide a federal forum for impor-
tant disputes where state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-state
litigants. The presence of parties from the same State on both sides of a case dispels
this concern, eliminating a principal reason for conferring § 1332 jurisdiction over
any of the claims in the action.
Id. at 2617-18. The Court similarly remarked in the same opinion: "[Tihe presence of
nondiverse parties on both sides of a lawsuit eliminates the justification for providing a federal
forum." Id. at 2614.
38 For a more extensive discussion of the cases involving such instances of forum shop-
ping giving rise to the fraudulent joinder doctrine, see James M. Underwood, From Proxy to
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practice could thwart the principles of fair adjudication underlying the
grant of diversity jurisdiction in § 1332, the Supreme Court articu-
lated what has become known as the "fraudulent joinder" exception to
complete diversity.
Beginning as early as 1886, the Supreme Court recognized that
when the plaintiff demonstrated "no possible" claim against the local
defendant, such defendant would be treated as a "sham" party and its
citizenship disregarded. 39 The Court even went so far as to adopt such
an aggressive rule of fraudulent joinder that the actual motives for the
plaintiff in joining the local defendant were held to be irrelevant:
"The case falls clearly within the authorities announcing the principle
that in a removal proceeding the motive of the plaintiff in joining
defendants is immaterial ....
Perhaps more telling to this discussion than the creation of the
fraudulent joinder doctrine, however, is the judicial attitude articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in applying the doctrine:
While the plaintiff, in good faith, may proceed in the state
courts upon a cause of action which he alleges to be joint, it is
equally true that the Federal courts should not sanction de-
vices intended to prevent a removal to a Federal court where
one has that right, and should be equally vigilant to protect
the right to proceed in the Federal court as to permit the state
courts, in proper cases, to retain their own jurisdiction.4'
Between the vigilance the federal courts displayed in finding
fraudulent joinder so as to permit diversity jurisdiction, when no
complete diversity appeared on the face of the pleadings, and the
courts' willingness to liberally construe removal's statutory proce-
dures, even in instances where clearly the defendant had not satisfied
the requirements for removal, the federal courts seemed to embrace
their diversity jurisdiction during the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries. But a new attitude began to emerge in the next bend in the road.
Principle: Fraudulent Joinder Reconsidered, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1013 (2006).
39 Plymouth Consolidated Gold Min. Co. v. Amador & Sacramento Canal Co., 118 U.S.
264, 270-71 (1886) (finding no fraudulent joinder on the facts of the case). A clear instance of
the court finding such fraudulent joinder occurred in Wecker v. Nat'l Enameling & Stamping
Co., 204 U.S. 176 (1907), where the Court found that the local defendant had been "joined for
the purpose of defeating the right of the corporation to remove the case to the Federal court."
Id. at 185.
40 Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 189 (1931).
41 Wecker v. Nat'l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1907).
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2. From Vigilant Protection to Scrupulous Confinement
With the end of the Civil War, the federal courts began to
experience increased case loads and the bloom seemed to be off of the
42diversity rose. This emergence of additional cases resulted from two
phenomena: (1) beginning in 1875, Congress chose to legislate for the
federal trial courts to exercise general federal question jurisdiction; 43
and (2) the emerging economic growth of the late nineteenth century
saw increasing interstate business transactions that, not surprisingly,
led to more civil lawsuits between citizens of different states." As
one contemporary legal scholar summarized the situation: "[T]he
small tide of litigation that formerly flowed in Federal channels has
swollen into a mighty stream.1
4 5
While hardly immediate, this ever-swelling stream of cases into
the federal courthouses seems to have had a gradual impact upon the
prevailing judicial attitude toward diversity jurisdiction.46 Arguably
some hints of at least a new judicial wavering for diversity are evident
in some lower court opinions from as early as the late nineteenth cen-
tury,47 as what developed among federal judges was an "uneasy ten-
sion in the federal courts [that] continued throughout the first few
decades of the twentieth century. ' 48 The culmination of this emerging
negative attitude appeared in Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,49
42 See Haiber, supra note 15, at 622:
Expanded removal opportunities and the creation of federal question ju-
risdiction greatly increased the reach of the federal courts. At the same
time, commercial development following the Civil War increased the
volume of litigation. This combination resulted in exploding federal
dockets .... Not everyone welcomed this development .... The inevita-
ble reaction was criticism of expanding federal jurisdiction .... A more
common reaction was to press for a curtailment of all federal jurisdiction,
including removal jurisdiction.
Id. at 622-23.
43 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (current version 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)).
44 JOHN F. DILLON, REMOVAL OF CAUSES FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURTS 2-3 (Henry
Campbell Black ed., Cent. Law Journal Co., 5th ed. 1889).
45 Id. at 3.
46 Id.
47 Haiber, supra note 15, at 627-28 (referring to two lower federal decisions in 1886 and
1891 as "seeds of [a] doctrinal shift" against diversity removals):
[W]hile the removal statutes themselves did not greatly change in the first half of the
twentieth century, judicial attitudes towards those statutes underwent a transforma-
tion that was subtle yet radical. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, federal courts
stopped treating removal as a procedural device that protected a defendant's equal
and constitutionally-based right to a federal forum. Instead, in the eyes of many fed-
eral judges, removal degenerated into a procedural anomaly that deprived a plaintiff
of his superior "right" to select the forum of his choice.
Id. at 627.
48 Haiber, supra note 15, at 630.
49 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
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in which the Court made two related pronouncements concerning
diversity removals. 50 First, the Court observed that there was a con-
gressional intention to "restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts
on removal, [and that] the policy of the successive acts of Congress
regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict
construction of such legislation.' Second, the Court opined that
"[d]ue regard for the rightful independence of state governments...
requires that [federal courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdic-
tion to the precise limits which the statute has defined.,
52
At least in hindsight, it seems that this apparent shift in judicial at-
titude against diversity might not have been so difficult to predict. In
the few years preceding Shamrock, two other noteworthy decisions
were rendered by the high court--one that had the effect of diluting
federal courts' desire to handle diversity cases and the other signaling
a new, overly restrictive attitude in interpreting the diversity statute.
First, prior to 1938 federal courts hearing diversity cases had been
free to create and apply federal common law in cases where no local
statutes governed. According to the Swift doctrine,53 the Rules of De-
cision Act-which required federal courts to apply state "law" except
in cases where federal statutes governed-had no application in cases
where the claims were recognized only under the common law.
54
Thus, the Swift doctrine served the purpose of allowing federal courts
to divine the common law that ought to be followed by all courts in
the United States. Unfortunately, the "[p]ersistence of state courts in
their own opinions on questions of common law prevented [such]
uniformity. 55 For this, and other constitutional reasons,56 the Su-
50 The immediate question before the court was whether a right to remove was vested
solely in a defendant. The court held that plaintiffs had no right to remove a case filed in state
court. In response to a counterclaim, the original plaintiff attempted to remove the case to fed-
eral court. The specifics of this holding have been criticized "because its effect is to prevent
removal in cases in which there would be no question of the opposing party's right to remove if
the counterclaim were brought as a separate action." JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY
KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 57 (WestGroup 3d ed. 1999).
51 Shamrock, 313 U.S. at 108.
52 Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
53 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
54 As the Court held in Swift:
[The] decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects [as general principles of law
and "doctrines of commercial jurisprudence"] are entitled to, and will receive, the
most deliberate attention and respect of this Court; but they cannot furnish positive
rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up and
governed. The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the
language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde... to be in a great
measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world ....
Id. at 18.
55 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
5 The Erie court also intimated that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the states the
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preme Court in the Erie case reversed Swift and held that federal
courts had no business making up common law to govern in diversity
cases but instead had to apply the common law as found by the appli-
cable state's highest court.57 As a result, there would be no "federal
general common law" 58 and the federal courts were out of the law-
making business in exercising their diversity jurisdiction. The recog-
nition of the limited function of federal courts sitting in diversity
might have deflated the remaining interest of many federal judges in
hearing such cases thereafter.
Second, two years prior to Shamrock the Supreme Court issued a
jurisdictionally stifling opinion in Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.59 That
decision involved the amount-in-controversy requirement of the
diversity statute which has been designed to ensure that only diversity
cases that were relatively large would be on the federal courts'
dockets.6° The precise issue was, assuming the existence of complete
diversity between the opposing litigants, whether it was sufficient if
only one of two named plaintiffs independently possessed a claim
valued at greater than the jurisdictional minimum. The court rejected
any such tag-along diversity jurisdiction despite the fact that at least
one of the claimants had a claim big enough to be worthy of federal
court treatment and that permitting the other claimant to join in the
federal court suit would not only further federal court efficiency but
would also serve, in a very practical sense, to make the "amount in
controversy" for the case larger rather than smaller.61 This holding
power to create common law on issues of basic law. Id. at 78-80.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 78.
59 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
60 The original amount-in-controversy-$500--has been raised over the years to its cur-
rent level of $75,000. Setting the amount involves a balancing of interests with the goal being
for the minimum amount to be set "not... so high as to convert the Federal courts into courts of
big business nor so low as to fritter away their time in the trial of petty controversies." S. REP.
No. 1830, at 4 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101. See WRIGHT, supra note
14, at § 32 n. 4.
61 Arguably the Clark decision was a mere extension of the much older rule against ag-
gregation that dictated that co-plaintiffs could not jointly satisfy the amount-in-controversy
requirement of the diversity statute by pooling their respective small claims together. See Stew-
art v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1885) (applying a non-aggregation rule in the context of
federal appellate jurisdiction); Walter v. Northeastern R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 370, 373 (1893) (ap-
plying non-aggregation rule in context of federal trial court diversity jurisdiction). A prior
classic statement of the rule against non-aggregation was provided in 1911 by the Supreme
Court:
When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, unite for con-
venience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of
the requisite jurisdictional amount; but when several plaintiffs unite to enforce a sin-
gle title or right, in which they have a common and undivided interest, it is enough if
their interests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount.
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made little sense and has been harshly criticized by many
commentators:
[I]n the situation now considered, the party with the claim for
more than [the statutory minimum] has a statutory right to as-
sert that claim in federal court and, if aggregation is not per-
mitted, the party with the smaller claim must bring a wasteful
independent suit in state court. The commentators have
thought that in these circumstances the two parties should be
permitted to join .... 62
The strained and illogical reading of the diversity statute by the
Supreme Court in Clark led to the evolution of various rules
concerning aggregation of damages that are described as
"haphazard, '63 "mystifying," 64 and "unsatisfactory. 65 Yet these rules
continue today, at least insofar as the interpretation of § 1332 is
concerned.66 By interpreting § 1332 in such a narrow and
intellectually unsatisfying manner, the Supreme Court struck a harsh
blow to the exercise of diversity jurisdiction by reducing the number
of diversity cases that would be initially filed in federal court and by
eliminating many other instances of removal from state courts. 6 7 For
these reasons, the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Shamrock
Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911). But the difference is that the
older rule against aggregation of small claims operated only to keep claims that, by themselves,
were too small to permit any federal jurisdiction but the Clark decision would have the impact
of preventing joinder of claims in a federal forum, appropriate for at least one of the claims,
when logically the claims should be tried together under the liberal joinder provisions of the
then-new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
62 WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 213.
63 Id. at 209. For example, while related claims held by two plaintiffs (say a husband and
wife both hurt in the same automobile accident) cannot be aggregated, the completely unrelated
claims of one claimant can be aggregated in order to satisfy § 1332. As Professor Wright notes,
"[a] good argument could be made that in each of these situations the result should be precisely
the opposite what it has traditionally been." Id. at 210.
64 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Graves, 381 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (W.D. La. 1974).
65 WRIGHT, supra note 14, at § 36.
66 As will be discussed in Part Ill, Congress' enactment of the Supplemental Jurisdiction
Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1367) has changed the effect of Clark, at least in certain contexts, without
impacting Clark's mandate for how § 1332 itself should be interpreted. See WRIGHT, supra note
14, at 215 ("These rules about aggregation have not been changed by the 1990 statute codifying
what previously had been known as 'ancillary jurisdiction' and 'pendent jurisdiction' under the
name of 'supplemental jurisdiction."').
67 Because the removal statutes require the federal court to have original jurisdiction over
the entire case being removed from state court, the presence of even one claimant with too small
a claim to satisfy § 1332 has consistently been held to preclude removal of all or any portion of
the case to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000); see generally Everett v. Verizon Wire-
less, Inc., 460 F.3d 818, 822-30 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing the impropriety of removal when
plaintiffs' claims do not satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirements of the diversity statute).
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may be viewed as more descriptive of an anti-diversity attitude that
had already been formed during the preceding decade than
prescriptive of the ensuing decisions.
In any event, the lower federal courts took up the Shamrock
court's invitation to officially begin treating diversity as the unwel-
come member of the jurisdictional family:
In subsequent years, federal courts (after dutifully referencing
federalism and the alleged congressional hostility toward all
federal jurisdiction) cited Shamrock Oil for the proposition
that a plaintiff' s right to select a forum is more important than
a defendant's right to removal. Courts have also cited Sham-
rock Oil for the proposition that all doubts must be resolved
in favor of remand.6
These multiple judicial statements invoking a "presumption" against a
defendant's right to remove stand on somewhat shaky analytical
ground, apart from Shamrock's dictate for courts to simply maintain
such a position. Professor Marcus raises some difficult questions for
proponents of this presumption:
Does that make any sense? Congress had made certain claims
nonremovable in order to assure plaintiffs an absolute choice
between state and federal courts. See e.g., 28 USCA § 1445
(precluding removal of certain actions against railroads or ac-
tions under workers' compensation laws). If Congress has not
done so more generally, should the courts nevertheless incline
against exercising removal jurisdiction? Would it be proper to
68 Haiber, supra note 15, at 631-32 (citing, at various portions of the article, Marathon Oil
Co. v. Ruhgas, 145 F.3d 211, 219 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1998) ("The defendant's right to remove and
the plaintiff's right to choose the forum are not equal.")); In re World Trade Center Disaster Site
Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (referring to the "right of plaintiffs to choose
the forum in which to bring suit" and holding that this called for strict construction of
jurisdiction); Maloan v. BancorpSouth Bank, Inc., No. 01-1366, 2002 WL 1397266, at *3 (W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 29, 2002) (stating that Shamrock requires strict construction of removal statutes "to
protect the state courts from usurpation by federal courts"); City of Univ. City v. AT&T
Wireless Servs., 229 F. Supp. 2d 927, 933 (E.D. Mo. 2002) ("there is a presumption in favor of
remand"); Coca-Cola Bottling of Emporia, Inc. v. South Beach Beverage Co., 198 F. Supp.2d
1280, 1285 (D. Kan. 2002) (using a reasonable certainty test to determine the amount in
controversy under § 1332 due to the "presumption against removal"); Auchinleck v. Town of
LaGrange, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 (E.D. Wis. 2001) ("[T]he plaintiff's right to choose his
forum is superior to the defendant's right of removal."); Harris Corp. v. Kollsman, Inc., 97 F.
Supp. 2d 1148, 1150 (M.D. Fla. 2000) ("finding that" Shamrock requires strict construction to
effectuate policy of favoring a "plaintiff's right to choose its own forum"). See infra notes 180,
184, 236-37.
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interpret §§ 1331 and 1332 against exercise of federal juris-
diction when the plaintiff wants to be in federal court?
69
Such skepticism of the validity behind such an attitude from the
bench is reminiscent of Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., in which he argued that the courts must be
careful not to impose limitations on jurisdictional statutes passed by
Congress:
The opinion of the Court cuts deep into our judicial fabric.
The duty of the judiciary is to exercise the jurisdiction which
Congress has conferred. What the Court is doing today I
might wholeheartedly approve if it were done by Congress.
But I cannot justify translation of the circumstance of my
membership on this Court into an opportunity of writing my
private view of legislative policy into law and thereby effac-
ing a far greater area of diversity jurisdiction than Senator
Norris, as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was
ever able to persuade Congress itself to do.
70
While certain statements concerning interpreting jurisdictional
statutes conservatively are, on their face, equally applicable to federal
question removals as to diversity removals, in application the federal
courts today seem to be particularly aggressive in ruling against re-
moval in the diversity context:
Additionally, a relatively widespread perception exists that
many federal judges consider removal inappropriate in cases
involving diversity jurisdiction. It would be strange indeed if
this judicial aversion to diversity jurisdiction did not lead to
broader restrictions on the removal process. In fact, in several
cases, courts have indicated that strict limitations upon the
removal process serve as an indirect means of restricting di-
versity jurisdiction.
In addition to a particular distaste for diversity
jurisdiction, some decisions suggest that judicial hostility
toward removal results more from a practical desire to relieve
69 RICHARD L. MARcus, MARTiN H. REDISH & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
A MODERN APPROACH 912 (3d ed. WestGroup 2000).
70 319 U.S. 315, 348 (1943) (Frankfiuter, J., dissenting).
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overburdened federal dockets than from lofty concerns
regarding federalism or the institutional role of the courts.7"
The result of this mindset, particularly in the case of attempted di-
versity removals, is a body of case law from the various circuits im-
posing many restrictive interpretations on the procedures required to
properly remove a case from state court.72 Indeed, it is not hyperbole
to characterize removal procedure as a trap for the unwary litigator
where form is elevated over substance and the purposes behind diver-
sity are too frequently left behind in the analysis.73
During the last half of the twentieth century, judicial
disparagement of diversity jurisdiction became even more
transparent. During the 1940s and 50s, as the Supreme Court
continued to advocate within its opinions for a restrictive
interpretation of the diversity statute,74 several Supreme Court
Justices lobbied for congressional abolishment of diversity
jurisdiction. While recognizing that such lobbying should occur in
scholarly writings rather than judicial opinions, Justice Frankfurter
7' Haiber, supra note 15, at 639-40. A good example frequently cited of this federal court
fixation with docket reduction is Thermton Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344
(1976), where the district court remanded the case to state court solely because the federal judge
believed that his docket was too crowded. The Supreme Court found that such an unauthorized
rationale for remand actually justified a rare right to challenge the remand in the appellate
courts. Id. Some judges have explained that the strict construction applied to the diversity statute
was appropriate because such jurisdiction infringes upon states' rights: "A second, more subtle,
but equally important reason for strict construction of removal statutes is that the exercise of
removal jurisdiction-particularly when based on diversity-is in derogation of State sover-
eignty .... A federal judge, sensitive to the delicate nature of federal-State relations, must take
care not to assume jurisdiction of a case or controversy that belongs exclusively before a State
tribunal." Thompson v. Gillen, 491 F. Supp. 24, 26-27 (E.D. Va. 1980).
72 Reflecting a similar attitude, a plurality of the federal circuits today employ an ex-
tremely conservative standard for analyzing fraudulent joinder that essentially applies a Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) inquiry where the plaintiff's factual allegations concerning the local defendant
in question are all presumed to be true and may not be negated by a removing party's use of
extra-pleading factual submission. This results in fraudulent joinder diversity removals to fed-
eral courts, in those circuits, to be a nearly insurmountable burden. See Underwood, supra note
38, at *38-46.
73 According to Professor Haiber, "federal courts [have] littered the removal landscape
with a daunting array of procedural landmines for the litigator to navigate. These judicially
created landmines have kept a large number of cases off the federal docket." Haiber, supra
note 15, at 609. Professor Haiber does an excellent and thorough job discussing, and criticizing,
these various court-invoked procedural limitations on the right to remove. See generally Haiber,
supra note 15, at 641-56. See also Derek S. Hollingsworth, Comment, Section 1446: Remedy-
ing the Fifth Circuit's Removal Trap, 49 BAYLOR L. REv. 157, 158 (1997) (discussing one
example of removal procedure involving a "precarious trap" for litigants, concerning the timing
of removal in relation to service of a defendant in a multiple defendant lawsuit).
74 See, e.g., Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Pinnoak Resources, L.L.C. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London,
394 F. Supp. 2d 821, 825 (S.D. W.Va. 2005) (referring to American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn,
341 U.S 6 (1951) (stating that the Supreme Court believed "Congress [had manifested a] clear
intention.., to restrict removal in favor of retaining state court jurisdiction...").
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nevertheless voiced his personal objection to such jurisdiction in
some of his judicial opinions:
[W]hether diversity jurisdiction is necessary or desirable in
order to avoid possible unfairness by state courts, state judges
and juries, against outsiders, whether the federal courts ought
to be relieved of the burden of diversity litigation-these are
matters which are not my concern as a judge. They are the
concern of those whose business it is to legislate, not mine. I
speak as one who has long favored the entire abolition of di-
versity jurisdiction. But I must decide this case as a judge and
not as a legislative reformer.75
Justice Jackson similarly stated in 1955 that "the greatest contribution
that Congress could make to the orderly administration of justice in
the United States would be to abolish the jurisdiction of the federal
courts which is based solely on the ground that the litigants are
citizens of different states. 76 Similar sentiments were expressed by
Chief Justice Warren77 and, later, by Chief Justice Burger.78 The
subsequent dramatic rise in civil rights cases beginning in the early
1960s, filed in federal courts under the federal judiciary's federal
question jurisdiction, doubtlessly added further grist to those critics of
diversity that believed the federal courts were becoming too
congested.79
C. Apocalypse Now?
The antagonism for diversity jurisdiction, which had its roots in
the post-Civil War years and that grew during the first half of the
75 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 337 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
76 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERN-
MENT 38 (1955).
'n Earl Warren, 36th Annual Meeting, A.L.I. PROC. 27-33 (1959).
78 Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 62 A.B.A. J. 443, 444
(1976).
79 Professor Wright indicates that there was a dramatic rise in civil rights lawsuits filed in
federal courts beginning with the early 1960s:
Although the principal civil-rights statutes go back to the Reconstruction period, for
many years they were rarely used. This situation has changed dramatically in the last
three decades. In 1961 there were 296 civil-rights cases filed in federal courts, or
barely half of one percent of all the civil cases commenced in that year. In the year
ended September 30, 1992, by contrast, there were 30,556 civil-rights cases filed by
federal and state prisoners ... and 24,233 civil-rights cases by persons other than
prisoners. Taken together these were nearly 24% of the civil cases commenced in
that year.
WRIGHT, supra note 14, at § 22A.
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twentieth century, gathered tremendous momentum during the 1970s.
This growing cloud over the head of diversity culminated with at least
one house of Congress finally passing legislation to abolish diversity
jurisdiction 8° and with a bipartisan federal court review committee
advocating for the demise of the doctrine. 81 It appeared that diversity
might not be around for much longer.
Following the lead of the Supreme Court, many lower federal
judges exhibited an increasing antipathy toward diversity jurisdiction.
Good examples of this attitude are rampant in the published opinions
of many federal, and state, judges:
When Congress chooses to abolish diversity jurisdiction, as I
hope it will, the federal courts will be spared the burdensome
task of divining state law in cases like this one .... I deeply
deplore the burden placed upon us by the no-longer-
warranted or necessary imposition of diversity jurisdiction
upon federal courts .... 2
This case could be a poster child for the movement to abolish
diversity jurisdiction . . . . Certainly this is not the type of
case that would excite the courts of one state to exhibit preju-
dice against litigants from another .... [I]t is worthwhile for
Congress to consider whether the rationale that justified the
creation of diversity jurisdiction is any longer valid and
whether it is applicable to litigation such as this.
83
To the extent that diversity jurisdiction continues to exist in
federal district courts, the potential for state-federal friction
will continue. That is inherent in the exercise of diversity ju-
risdiction. Many federal judges today are convinced that the
time has come to abolish or severely restrict diversity juris-
80 See infra note 89.
81 See infra note 101.
82 Smith v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757, 761 (2nd Cir. 1980) (Mans-
field, J., dissenting). The placement of this editorial in an Erie context underscores the possibil-
ity that at least one reason for federal disdain for diversity took on increased momentum follow-
ing Erie's renunciation of the Swift doctrine (permitting federal common law in diversity cases).
83 Gold Star Flooring Specialist, Inc. v. Manshul Construction Corp., 1995 U.S. DIST.
LEXIS 5120, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 1995).
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diction and thus allow the state courts exclusive jurisdiction
over state law issues.84
This Court will not conceal its disaffection for the notion that
federal jurisdiction over disputes between citizens of different
States is necessary to protect out-of-State parties from local
prejudice. State judges, no less than federal judges are obli-
gated to provide a neutral forum. Moreover, State judges, in
comparison to federal judges, are more likely to have compe-
tence; experience, and expertise in tort, contract, and real es-
tate litigation; suits of this nature, which often are removable
due to diversity, are ordinary grist for the mill of State
courts.
8 5
As an epilogue to this judicial merry-go-round, it should be
noted that efforts have been made over the past years to have
the Congress abolish the diversity jurisdiction of the Federal
courts in cases involving State created rights .... But alas,
this solution may be said to be too simple, too easy-too
intelligent.
86
Judges have not been alone in bemoaning diversity jurisdiction.
Legal scholars have continued to sneer at diversity jurisdiction as
well. Echoing the sentiments of Professor Rowe from twenty years
earlier, Professor Chemerinsky fairly recently stated, "The primary
argument for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction is that it is unnec-
essary and costly. Diversity jurisdiction is perceived as an anachronis-
tic relic by those who believe that its original justifications are no
longer valid. ' ' 87 According to another observer, "Every administration
since President Carter's, the Judicial Conference, the American Law
Institute, state courts, numerous public interest and legal aid organiza-
tions, and most legal scholars support the abolition or curtailment of
diversity." 88 The number of law review articles attacking diversity
jurisdiction has continued to blossom. 89
84 Atlantic Mut. v. 1T Corp., 842 F. Supp. 910,913 (M.D. La. 1994).
8 Thompson v. Gillen, 491 F. Supp. 24, 26 n.I (E.D. Va. 1980).
8 S. Ry. Co v. Hogue, 162 S.E.2d 471,472 (Ga. App. 1968).
87 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 288.
88 Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97, 98.
9 Professor Bassett offers a good recapitulation of the scholarly attacks on diversity juris-
diction, as well as her own able assault on the doctrine, in her recent article on the subject. See
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Doubtlessly spurred by such academic, judicial and special interest
group 9° attacks, Congress gave diversity jurisdiction a serious scare.
Beginning in the 1970s, about the same time that our planet's fate was
still in doubt according to Hal Lindsey, Congress undertook consid-
eration of the elimination of the diversity statute. In 1978, the House
of Representatives twice overwhelmingly passed a bill that would
have eliminated the diversity jurisdiction statute.91 Although this was
never even voted upon in the Senate,92 Congress did agree on two less
severe approaches to limiting diversity cases a few years later. In
1988, Congress increased § 1332's amount-in-controversy require-
ment to fifty thousand dollars.93 During the same session, Congress
added a one-year absolute time limit on removals based "solely upon"
diversity of citizenship.94 This was an arbitrary limit applied only to
diversity cases and has led to what even the Commentary to the 1988
amendments characterizes as "tactical chicanery" by the plaintiffs'
bar.95 Such counsel have proven to be able to avoid removal fairly
easily by either initially limiting the damages claimed, or adding non-
diverse parties to the case, and then restructuring the suit after one
year when the case is no longer removable.
96
generally Bassett, supra note 21. Another good listing of such academic input on the issue was
collected by Professor Wright. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 141-52.
90 To be fair, there are obviously special interest groups on both sides of the diversity de-
bate. As Professor Wright has observed "[a]ny proposal to modify diversity meets immediate
organized opposition from those who believe that they have a vested interest in preserving, for
their own advantage, the widest possible choice of forum." WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 151-52.
9' S. Res. 1613, 95th Cong., 124 CONG. REC. 33546 (1978); H.R. Res. 9622, 95th Cong.,
124 CONG. REc. 5009 (1978).
92 See WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 152.
93 Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201, 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988) (amend-
ing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332). In 1996, Congress acted again raising the minimum amount from
$50,000 to $75,000, where it stands today. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-317, § 205, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (1996).
94 Act of Nov. 19, 1988, § 1016.
95 The Commentary to the 1988 revisions candidly admits that this one-year limit on di-
versity removals would be used to the tactical advantage of plaintiffs:
The amendment may sometimes give too much control to the state court plaintiff
who wants to resist a removal to the federal court at all costs. It can invite tactical
chicanery. A plaintiff with the motive of defeating removal, for example, may be able
to join as a defendant, in a case in which there is genuine diversity between the
plaintiff and the other defendants, someone of nondiverse citizenship whom the
plaintiff does not really intend to sue but who is arguably liable on the claim and
hence properly joined under state law. The plaintiff can then just wait a year and
drop that party, polishing the action to just the point desired and at the same time dis-
solving the threat of federal jurisdiction. The one-year cutoff therefore has an anti-
diversity ring to it. Congress acknowledged this, but called it a "modest curtailment."
Commentary to 1988 Revisions to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (emphasis added).
96 The American Trial Lawyers Association, in one of their official publications, offers a
candid bit of advice to its members concerning how to avoid a federal forum:
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Two years after Congress nipped at the feet of diversity jurisdic-
tion, and close to diversity's bicentennial, the most serious threat to
diversity jurisdiction in its history arose. In 1988 Congress had com-
missioned a "distinguished body' 97 of prominent judges, academics,
and legislators in order to
make a complete study of the courts of the United States and
of the several states and transmit a report to the President, the
Chief Justice of the United States, the Congress, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the Conference of Chief Jus-
tices, and the State Justice Institute on such study.98
The resulting blue ribbon Study Committee was created by Congress
in response to "mounting public and professional concern with the
federal courts' congestion, delay, expense, and expansion." 99 The
Study Committee embarked on what it considered the "most compre-
hensive examination of the federal court system in the last half cen-
tury-a period of unprecedented growth and change in federal law
and federal courts." 1°° After fifteen months of study, the committee
released its official report in the spring of 1990. Among its other rec-
ommendations, the Study Committee made the historic proposal to
eliminate generally 0 1 any diversity jurisdiction in the federal trial
courts:
After extensive discussion, a substantial majority of the
committee strongly recommends that Congress eliminate this
basis of federal jurisdiction, subject to certain narrowly de-
fined exceptions .... We believe that diversity jurisdiction
should be virtually eliminated for two simple reasons: On the
one hand, no other class of cases has a weaker claim on fed-
[T]o avoid removal to federal court in cases where it is deemed advisable to do so, a
wise strategy for a plaintiff in a personal injury case is to look for a valid claim
against a local party in the forum in which the plaintiff seeks to file the claim. To
remove a case, all defendants must consent to removal [except in the case of fraudu-
lent joinder that would defeat diversity jurisdiction], but if there is a local defendant,
removal is not an option despite consent.
Michael L. Williams & John Waldman, Parties, in ATLA'S LmGATING TORT CASES, ch. 5,
§ 5:33, 5-36 (Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S. Cusimano, eds., 2003).
97 WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 152.
98 10 1 S CONG. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrITEE, 31 (1990) [herein-
after REPORT].
99 Id. at 3.
l0 d.
101 The Study Committee recognized that there might still be a few niche areas where spe-
cialized diversity jurisdiction might make sense, such as suits involving aliens, interpleader
suits, and certain complex cases involving mass accidents. Id. at 40.
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eral judicial resources. On the other hand, no other step will
do anywhere nearly as much to reduce federal case load pres-
sures and contain the growth of the federal judiciary. Given
all the demands on the federal courts, there is little reason to
use them for contract disputes or automobile accident suits
simply because the parties live across state boundaries-
especially when litigants who do not live in different states
must bring otherwise identical suits in state courts.1
0 2
Given the widespread-though not unanimous103-support on the
committee for this elimination proposal and the fact that Congress
acted positively with respect to other proposals made in the same re-
port by the Study Committee, °4 there was every reason to support
prognostications that diversity jurisdiction was in its last days. 10 5 Was
diversity-the original bulwark of federal trial courts' jurisdictional
existence-about to finally meet its doom?
1HI. REBIRTH OF THE PHOENIX AND ABANDONMENT OF
ORIGINAL MOTIVES
Faced with the invitation to virtually eliminate diversity
jurisdiction for the federal trial courts in the spring of 1990, Congress
chose a different path. Congress has taken three distinctive legislative
steps toward realizing the potential that Article 1l diversity
jurisdiction affords, with each step illustrating an increasingly bold
utilization of this power. First, Congress codified the twin doctrines
102 Id. at 39.
103 For example, Judge Diana Gribbon Motz, a sitting judge on the Fourth Circuit Court ot
Appeals and a former member of the Federal Courts Study Committee, stated in one judicial
opinion that she had voted against the Committee's recommendation to abolish diversity be-
cause she had no animus against jurisdiction over such claims. See Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc.,
272 F.3d 243, 253 (4th Cir. 2001) (Motz, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc in case
involving the interpretation of § 1367). The Report itself notes dissenting statements from
Senator Grassley, Morris Harrell, and now-judge Motz-who all objected to the virtual aboli-
tion of diversity jurisdiction. See REPORT, supra note 98, at 42-43.
104 In 1990 Congress passed the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
104 Stat. 5089 (1990), which enacted many of the Study Committee's proposals. See John B.
Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial
Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 735, 737 n.3 (1991) (summarizing
changes). For example, the Report recommended the codification of ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction, which was accomplished later that same year by Congress through the passage of
the supplemental jurisdiction statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
105 According to one New York Times article written concerning the Federal Courts Study
Committee's report, "the movement to weaken diversity jurisdiction further '... is expected to
gain considerable momentum."' Victor Eugene Flango, How Will the Abolition of Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction Affect State Courts?, 74 JUDICATURE 35, 36 (1990) (quoting Stephen
Labaton, Business and the Law: Panel Urges End to Diversity Rule, N.Y. Times Jan. 8, 1990
at 2).
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of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction through enactment of the
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute in 1990.1°6 Whether intentional or
not, the way Congress codified these doctrines has served to reinforce
federal courts' flexibility to entertain as one constitutional "case" a
broader range of claims and parties than it would have been otherwise
able to accomplish using the diversity statute alone. Further, this
enactment has had the impact of overruling established anti-diversity
precedent that previously helped to usher in the federal hostility
toward entertaining diversity cases. Second, Congress enacted the
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Statute, effective in January of
2003,1°7 permitting federal courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction
over certain mass tort claims even in the absence of complete
diversity of citizenship. Third, Congress finally passed the Class
Action Fairness Act in January 2005,108 after more than a decade of
serious debate and legislative wrangling. Among its other reform
features, the Class Action Fairness Act modified the diversity statute
to set forth special rules for diversity jurisdiction over putative class
actions. The statute now provides for federal jurisdiction over class
actions with an aggregate amount in controversy of only $5 million
and with the barest minimal diversity that the Constitution might be
willing to tolerate. By legislating in these three ways, Congress has
chosen a path that will lead to a resurgence in the importance of
diversity jurisdiction, and which may be a harbinger for additional
aggressive exercises of this Article III grant in the future.
A. Section 1367: Keeping the Federal Courts Relevant
Although the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute did not generate
much hoopla at the time of its passage in late 1990,1°9 the act became
a lightning rod for much of the anti-diversity sentiments of many
judges and legal scholars for the next fifteen years. 110 The ensuing
debate included a significant circuit split, with courts dividing over
whether to interpret the act literally even if this led to the repudiation
of such jurisdictional juggernauts as Clark,' Zahn," 2 and possibly
even Strawbridge.!3 The debate boiled until the summer of 2005,
M0 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
'o 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. 2002).
'°28 U.S.C.A. § 1453 (2006).
109James M. Underwood, Supplemental Serendipity: Congress' Accidental Improvement
of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 37 AKRON L. REv. 653, 671 (2004).
10 Id. at 671-72.
111 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
112414 U.S. 291 (1973).
13 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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when the Supreme Court finally resolved the principal interpretational
dilemma by holding that the federal courts must honor the letter of the
law and permit a broad exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in diver-
sity cases.' 14
The primary purpose of the act was simple enough-to codify, 5
and thereby give a firm statutory foundation to the preexisting doc-
trines of ancillary 16 and pendent jurisdiction."17 These doctrines were
judicial creations designed to permit federal courts to exercise their
jurisdictional powers so that they could decide an entire constitutional
"case," even if a portion of the case lacked its own jurisdictional
legs." 8 The concept underlying the doctrines is pragmatic:
[T]he rules developed to control the exercise of that jurisdic-
tion cannot be explained by any "single rationalizing princi-
ple." They are instead accommodations that take into account
the impact of the adjudication on parties and third persons,
the susceptibility of the dispute or disputes in the case to reso-
lution in a single adjudication, and the structure of the litiga-
tion as governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 19
Thus, supplemental jurisdiction historically permitted a federal court
to hear a case asserting a federal cause of action as well as a state law
claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence.
120
Supplemental jurisdiction allows a court, in a diversity lawsuit, to
114 Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
11 Professors Mengler, Rowe and Burbank, who helped to draft § 1367 for Congress,
stated that the act represented an attempt at "codification" of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction,
under the umbrella of "supplemental" jurisdiction, and that it was "framed to restore and regu-
larize supplemental jurisdiction." Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas M.
Mengler, Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation To Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction,
74 JUDICATURE 213, 215 (1991).
l16 While the terms have sometimes caused confusion, as a general proposition ancillary
jurisdiction has been understood to refer to the power of federal courts to hear additional claims
added by other litigants that lack their own independent basis in subject matter jurisdiction, such
as claims by defendants or third-party claims. See Report of the Subcomm. on the Federal
Courts and Their Relation to the States, 546 (Mar. 12, 1990), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITrEE, WORKING PAPERS AND SUBcOMMrrrEE REPORTS (July 1, 1990) ("Ancil-
lary jurisdiction refers to additional claims that are joined after the complaint is filed.") [herein-
after STUDY COMM. REPORT].
117 Id. ("Pendent jurisdiction refers to claims that are joined in the plaintiffs complaint.").
Is See Rowe et al., supra note 115, at 213 (The twin doctrines of pendent and ancillary ju-
risdiction "permit parties in many circumstances to litigate an entire controversy, typically all
transactionally-related claims, as long as the district court has a statutory basis for asserting
subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim raised in plaintiffs complaint.").
19 Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 305 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation re-
moved); see also RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1075-81 (David L. Shapiro et al., eds., 2d ed. 1973).
120 See, e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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also entertain a related third-party claim for contribution between two
non-diverse litigants.
12
In 1989, however, the Supreme Court "struck a near death-blow to
pendent party jurisdiction and threatened to topple the pillars underly-
ing all forms of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction."'122 In Finley v.
United States,123 the Supreme Court rejected pendent party jurisdic-
tion over a widow's tort claim against a local utility company even
though it arose out of the same event as her Federal Tort Claims Act
claim against the FAA' 24-- one that was required to be filed in federal
court. 125 In the opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, the Court found
that there was no congressional authorization for such exercise of
pendent party jurisdiction and, in so doing, raised a serious concern
about the continued validity of all exercises of the court-created con-
cepts of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.' 26 One way to view Finley
is as a judicial acknowledgment that Congress alone dictates the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts and that federal district courts cannot
hear a case unless Congress has expressly authorized it. This ac-
knowledgment is implicit in the Supreme Court's invitation to Con-
gress to bolster the foundationally challenged doctrines of pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction:
Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction con-
ferred by a particular statute can of course be changed by
Congress. What is of paramount importance is that Congress
be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive
rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it
adopts.
127
121 See, e.g., Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
122 James M. Underwood, Congress' Accidental Improvement of Supplemental Jurisdic-
tion, 37 AKRON L. REv. 653, 665 (2004).
123 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
124 Id. at 555-56.
125 Congress has required that all FTCA claims be filed in federal court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (2000).
126 Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-A Constitutional
and Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 887-89 (1992) (espousing a belief that Finley
undermined the very foundations of Gibbs); Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and
Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 247, 258 (discussing concern that Finley threatened
both ancillary and pendent jurisdiction); James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and
Section 1367: The Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 120 (1999)
(observing that Finley's "emphasis on the absence of a statute appeared to threaten many estab-
lished forms of supplemental jurisdiction over additional parties.").
127 Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
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Upon the urging of the Federal Courts Study Committee 28 and
with the assistance of legal scholars, 12 9 Congress quickly accepted
this invitation and reaffirmed the validity of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction under the new nomenclature of supplemental jurisdiction
by enacting § 1367 late in 1990. Everyone agrees that Congress
achieved its primary objective-legislatively overruling Finley by
providing, for the first time, a statutory foundation for the historic
usages of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. 130 As a part of the
codification of the general power to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction-reflected by subpart (a) of the statute--Congress also
inserted subpart (b) in an apparent effort to also codify some of the
historic court-created limitations on the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction in diversity cases.' 3 ' However, in crafting subsection (b)
of that statute, Congress accomplished more than a simple
codification of these limitations. It did not take too long after the
adoption of the statute before scholars reading its text carefully came
to the conclusion that certain "unforeseen consequences" might be
realized.
32
Due to the failure of subsection (b) to list among its exceptions the
joinder of co-plaintiffs under Rule 20 or Rule 23, federal circuit
courts obliged to follow the text of the new statute determined that
Congress-perhaps unwittingly-had overruled both Clark and
Zahn's requirements for each plaintiff (or class member) to independ-
ently satisfy § 1332's amount-in-controversy requirement. The Fifth
12The Study Committee recommended that Congress "should expressly authorize federal
courts to assert pendent jurisdiction over parties without an independent federal jurisdictional
base." STUDY COMM. REPORT, supra note 116, at 47. The Study Committee was concerned
about Finley's apparent retrenchment on the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction:
"['lhe Court's rationale may prohibit any exercise of pendent party jurisdiction and threatens to
eliminate pendent claim and ancillary jurisdiction as well. We recommend that Congress over-
rule Finley by codifying the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction." Id. at 547.
129 See Rowe et al., supra note 115, at 213 ("The authors participated in the drafting of the
legislation codifying supplemental jurisdiction at 28 U.S.C. § 1367.").
130Exxon Mobil v. Alapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2620 (2005) ("All parties to
this litigation and all courts to consider the question agree that § 1367 overturned the result in
Finley.").
131 Subpart (b) of § 1367 provides the following carve-out from the broad grant in sub-
part (a):
[In diversity cases] the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under
subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14,
19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons pro-
posed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene
as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction
over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of sec-
tion 1332.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000).
132 Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley
and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L. J. 445, 471 (1991).
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Circuit was one of the first circuits to confront the significance of the
omission of these references from the text of § 1367(b). 33 The Fifth
Circuit acknowledged that "[olmitting the class action from the ex-
ception [in subpart (b)] may have been a clerical error." Nevertheless,
the Fifth Circuit felt compelled by historic concepts of statutory inter-
pretation to follow the express language of the statute regardless of
any potentially conflicting legislative history.' 34 Certain other circuits
disagreed and held that the legislative history demonstrated that Con-
gress never intended to overrule Clark135 and Zahn,136 with a signifi-
cant resulting split in the circuits.
137
The interpretative controversy was finally resolved in the summer
of 2005 by the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services, Inc.138 In that decision, a triumph for historic
textualism, the Supreme Court held that it must abide by the explicit
text of the statute regardless of whether the text accurately reflected
congressional intent:
It is not immediately obvious why Congress would withhold
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs joined as parties
"needed for just adjudication" under Rule 19 but would allow
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs permissively joined
under Rule 20 [or Rule 23]. The omission of Rule 20 plain-
tiffs from the list of exceptions in § 1367(b) may have been
an "unintentional drafting gap".... If that is the case, it is up
133 In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 1995), affid by an equally divided court
sub nom., Free v. Abbott Labs., 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curiam).
34Md at 528-29 ("[The] statute is the sole repository of congressional intent where the
statute is clear and does not demand an absurd result.").
135 Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939). See discussion supra Part lI.B.2 concern-
ing the impact of Clark on federal courts' attitudes concerning diversity jurisdiction generally.
136Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (holding that each member of a class,
whether named or not, must independently possess a claim in excess of the minimum amount-
in-controversy requirement of § 1332).
137 Te majority of circuits agreed that the statute must be applied in a way that expands
diversity jurisdiction. See Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248 (11 th Cir.
2003); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2001); Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc.,
263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001); Stromberg Metal Works v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928
(7th Cir. 1996); In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided
court sub. non., Free v. Abbott Labs., 529 U.S. 333 (2000). The minority of circuits took the
view that the statute's legislative history demonstrates no intention by Congress to alter Clark or
Zahn's limitations on the breadth of diversity jurisdiction. See Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.,
370 F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2004); Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000); Meritcare
v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999); Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co.,
160 F.3d 631 (10th Cir. 1998).
MS 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
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to Congress rather than the courts to fix it. The omission may
seem odd, but it is not absurd.
139
As a result of this holding, federal district courts may now hear, under
their diversity jurisdiction, claims between diverse citizens even when
not all of the claimants possess claims that are large enough to satisfy
§ 1332 on their own.
The supplemental jurisdiction story is filled with significant
themes concerning federal court exercise of diversity jurisdiction.
Perhaps chief among these is the Supreme Court's continuing recog-
nition of Congress' predominant role in setting the jurisdictional
agenda of the lower federal courts even where the courts cannot either
discern or agree with that agenda. Further, the enactment of § 1367
demonstrates Congress' desire to maintain the federal courts as a vi-
able place where diversity claimants can continue to bring their entire
controversy for resolution, even where some claims would not satisfy
§ 1332 on their own. As one scholar summarized the impact of
§ 1367:
By swiftly supplying comprehensive statutory authority for
the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, present § 1367
prevented the seepage of authority to adjudicate supplemen-
tal state-law claims in the pendent-party, exclusive-federal-
jurisdiction context of Finley from becoming a ruinous
flood, depleting a reservoir of long-accumulated precedent
permitting federal courts to achieve the fair and efficient, ho-
listic disposition of complex, multi-claim and multi-party
litigation.1
40
And while Congress may very well have had no predilection that
§ 1367 would result in the overruling of Clark and Zahn-a conclu-
sion that is not universally shared 4 -Congress has ignored calls to
recodify supplemental jurisdiction to restore those jurisdiction-
1391d. at 2624.
140Jeffrey A. Pamess & Daniel J. Sennott, Expanded Recognition in Written Laws of An-
cillary Federal Court Powers: Supplementing the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 64 U. PrTt.
L. REv. 303,334-35 (2003).
141 There is actually some conflict in the legislative history concerning the possible over-
ruling of Clark and Zahn. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 2625-27 (discussing the fact that,
even if the Court were to peek at the statute's legislative history, there is ambiguity in that
history concerning whether Congress intended to expand the doctrines of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction rather than simply codify them).
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limiting holdings. 142 To this extent, Congress has effectively ratified
this expansion of diversity jurisdiction. 143
B. Section 1369: A New Frontier
Late in 2002, Congress finally enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1369-the
Multiparty, Multiforum Act, following consideration of related pro-
posals dating back several decades.' 44 This statute was designed to
"achieve judicial and litigant economy, as well as fairness to litigants,
by preventing repetitive litigation and inconsistent outcomes resulting
from multiple federal and state proceedings arising out of the same
transactions or events.' 45 The mechanism for achieving this goal was
jurisdictional-the creation of a special, minimal diversity statute to
allow federal courts to preside over any cases arising from certain
mass tort situations, as follows:
142 See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disas-
ter of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963, 989 (1991) (calling on Con-
gress to "immediately repeal section 1367 or adopt a simple amendment which restores" the
holdings of Clark and Zahn); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 1367 and All That: Recodifying Federal
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 IND. L.J. 53 (1998) (one of the statute's authors concluding that
the statute needs to be fixed to achieve its original purpose).
'
43 As both Clark and Zahn were both harshly, albeit fairly, criticized, it is hard to lament
their passing. See, e.g., 1 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 0.97[5], at
928 (arguing the courts should consider Zahn overruled); Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer,
Close Enough for Government Work: What Happens When Congress Doesn't Do Its Job,
40 EMORY L.J. 1007, 1008 n.6 (1991) ("Abrogating Zahn would hardly be absurd."); HOWARD
P. FINK, ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 434 (2d ed. 2002) ("Those require-
ments schizophrenically look to the citizenship of only the named class representatives for
purposes of determining diversity of citizenship ... but require that each class member with a
legally separate claim independently satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement."). Further,
despite Congress' abolition of Clark and Zahn, the republic still stands. See Lloyd C. Anderson,
The American Law Institute Proposal To Bring Small-Claim State-Law Class Actions Within
Federal Jurisdiction: An Affront to Federalism That Should Be Rejected, 35 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 325, 342 (2002) ("In the years since § 1367 was enacted, it has, for the most part, worked
well.").
14 For a discussion of prior proposals, see C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of Minimal Diver-
sity, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613, 613, 624-28 (2004). Commencing in the late 1970s, repeated bills
were introduced in Congress providing for the maintenance in federal court of any civil action
comprising multiple claims arising from the same transaction, occurrence, or course of conduct
(or, in later versions, accident), provided that "minimal diversity" of citizenship existed between
any two adverse parties in the action and certain other requirements were met. These proposals
culminated in the passage of the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002. For
example, one prior related bill proposed federal jurisdiction in cases with only minimal diversity
of citizenship arising from accidents involving more than twenty-five people, each of whom
suffered injuries of more than $50,000. See H.R. Res. 1252, 105th Cong. (1998), which was
adopted by the House but not the Senate.
145 Floyd, supra note 144, at 614. See also Laura Offenbacher, Note, The Multiparty, Mul-
tiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act: Opening the Door to Class Action Reform, 23 REV. LITIG. 177,
184 (2004) ("Because serious accidents inherently involve numerous plaintiffs, claims, and
defendants, overlapping class actions are likely to result. Eliminating this sort of duplicative
litigation is among the goals discussed in the legislative history of § 1369.").
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The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action involving minimal diversity between adverse parties
that arises from a single accident, where at least 75 natural
persons have died in the accident at a discrete location, if-
(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial
part of the accident took place in another State or
other location, regardless of whether that defendant is
also a resident of the State where a substantial part of
the accident took place;
(2) any two defendants reside in different States, re-
gardless of whether such defendants are also resi-
dents of the same State or States; or
(3) substantial parts of the accident took place in dif-
ferent States.146
According to the terms of this act, "minimal diversity exists
between adverse parties if any party is a citizen of a State and any
adverse party is a citizen of another State . .,,14' Thus, when the
other conditions of this statute are satisfied-chiefly, when seventy-
five or more people die in a single-location accident-§ 1369
abrogates the complete diversity holding of Strawbridge applicable to
cases under the general diversity statute and also eliminates any
amount-in-controversy requirement.1 48 No longer can plaintiffs filing
any case subject to the provisions of this act force a state court forum
on a defendant by including a non-diverse litigant in the mix. 149 By
permitting the filing in, or, more importantly, the removal to, a federal
forum, this act provides a mechanism for all such cases arising from
the "single accident" to then be consolidated under the Federal
Multidistrict Litigation statute. 150 In this way, the opening of the
14628 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (Supp. 2002).
14728 U.S.C. § 1369(c)(1).
1'The elimination of the amount-in-controversy requirement does not appear to be sig-
nificant since the act primarily grants federal jurisdiction to cases having inherently large dam-
age demands (i.e., wrongful death).
1 See supra Part II.B.i. for a discussion concerning fraudulent joinder. Because most fed-
eral circuits assume the truth of the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint in determining
whether there has been fraudulent joinder-thus, allowing the court to disregard the party
against whom the questionable claim is asserted-it is fairly easy for a plaintiff to destroy
complete diversity by naming a local defendant whether or not a serious claim against that party
exists.
,-28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000). For transfer and possible consolidation, the Multidistrict
Litigation statute generally only requires that two or more cases involving "one or more
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federal courts to such cases lacking complete diversity facilitates
coordinated litigation that would not be available if any of the cases
remained in state courts.
151
This statute has significant inherent limitations on its applicability.
First, the Act only creates federal court jurisdiction with minimal di-
versity when there is a single occurrence in one discrete location that
results in the deaths of at least seventy-five persons. 52 Accordingly, it
would not be too misleading to refer to this Act as the airplane crash
litigation statute. 153 Second, the Act contains a fairly ambiguously'
54
worded local controversy exception that may swallow a good portion
of the Act's application. The Act expressly requires federal district
courts to "abstain" from hearing cases otherwise subject to the Act
where a "substantial majority" of the plaintiffs and the "primary de-
fendants" are all citizens of the same state and in which the claims
will be governed by the laws of that same state. 55 Because of the
Act's "stringent limitations, ''15 6 it is not likely that the Act will create
any litigation run on the federal courthouses.
Even if relatively few cases will be taken to federal court under the
provisions of § 1369, however, Congress' enactment of this statute is
of tremendous importance as both a philosophical movement and a
bellwether of other exercises of diversity jurisdiction. Not only did
Congress make a rare use of its power to bestow upon the federal trial
common questions of fact" are presiding in different federal district courts, so long as
considerations of public and private factors support such transfer. See id. at § 1407(a). Further,
the Multiparty, Multiform Act requires district courts exercising the act's jurisdictional powers
to "promptly notify the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation of the pendency of the action"-
presumably to ensure that the Multidistrict Litigiation panel can exercise its sua sponte right to
order consolidation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(1).
151 There is no formal mechanism to require cooperation between state and federal courts
no matter how efficient this might be. Further, federal courts generally neither abstain from
hearing cases just because related cases are pending in state courts, see Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 808 (1976), nor can federal courts enjoin
state courts from going forward with competing civil actions, see Act of March 2, 1793, Ch. 22,
§5, 1 Stat. 333, 334-35 (1793).
15228 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (Supp. 2002).
53 As another writer has commented, the effect of the limitation of the Act to situations in-
volving the death of at least seventy-five persons in one "discrete location" is to that it will
generally only apply to high-profile accidents such as "airplane crashes, bridge collapses, hotel
fires, and train wrecks." Offenbacher, supra note 145, at 190-91. As Professor Floyd notes,
"[iun essence, the current Multiparty, Multiforum Act applies only to 'a very narrowly defined
category of cases,' such as airplane accidents." Floyd, supra note 144, at 627 (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 106-276, at 21 (1999) (concerning minority views on H.R. 2112, 106th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1999))).
"4See Georgene Vairo, Forum Selection-Legislation Update, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 2002,
at B7 (discussing the ambiguous nature of the terms used in the local controversy exception).
See also, Offenbacher, supra note 145, at 198-205.
15528 U.S.C. § 1369(b).
156 Floyd, supra note 145, at 627.
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courts minimal diversity power, 157 but it did so in a context having
nothing to do with the historical perception of diversity's purpose-
avoiding local bias: "The Act itself. . is not aimed at preventing
local bias against out-of-state litigants or even at promoting 'nation-
alization' by assuring a competent and neutral federal forum for
multistate business enterprises conducting business away from home.
Rather, the Act has been justified on the grounds of judicial effi-
ciency.' ' 158 The Act's lack of concern for local bias is clear when one
takes account of the rationale behind the complete diversity require-
ment of § 1332:
The Court ... has adhered to the complete diversity rule in
light of the purpose of the diversity requirement, which is to
provide a federal forum for important disputes where state
courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-state
litigants. The presence of parties from the same State on both
sides of a case dispels this concern, eliminating a principal
reason for conferring § 1332 jurisdiction over any of the
claims in the action.' 59
Because § 1369 affords diversity jurisdiction even if there are adverse
litigants from the same state, the grant of jurisdiction cannot be on
account of local bias. As will be discussed below, 160 such a movement
by Congress to bestow diversity jurisdiction for reasons unrelated to
the prevention of local bias represents a dramatic step by Congress,
which has "broad implications" for issues of federalism. 161
C. Class Action Fairness Act: The Return of the King
The most recent and practically significant advance taken by Con-
gress concerning the scope of diversity jurisdiction was perhaps also
its most controversial-passage of the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005.162 Since at least the late 1990s, there have been annual introduc-
157 The only other prior grant of minimal diversity Congress had made was for statutory in-
terpleader claims, which gives federal trial courts jurisdiction over claims for interpleader with
an amount in controversy of only five hundred dollars so long as at least two of the competing
claimants are diverse from one another. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (2000).
158 Floyd, supra note 144, at 628.
159 Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2617-18 (2005).
16°See infra Part II.D.
161 Floyd, supra note 144, at 627. Professor Floyd views such a movement as representing
an "enormous intrusionfl on the jurisdiction and functioning of the state courts" and suggests
that it is an unconstitutional affront to federalism. See generally id. at 627, 638-52.
162 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. This statute has been
codified now in several places, including 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d) (Supp. 2006) (granting mini-
mal diversity jurisdiction), § 1453 (setting forth special rules for removing class actions to
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tions in Congress of bills seeking to expand the scope of federal court
diversity jurisdiction for class actions. 63 These annual attempts to
reform class actions in Congress coincided with an emerging public
dissatisfaction with class actions, much of it fueled by stories of cou-
pon settlements of questionable value and of growing fees for class
counsel. 164 With uncharacteristically strong bipartisan support,
165
Congress finally acted on February 10, 2005 by passing the Class
Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), based upon the following congres-
sional determination:
Abuses in class actions undermine the national judicial sys-
tem, the free flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of
federal court, including the elimination of the requirement for unanimity as well as the home-
state defendant restriction on removal and the one-year period to remove a diversity case);
§ 1711 (definitions); § 1712 (discussing limits on coupon settlements and calculation of class
counsel fees); § 1713 (limiting courts' ability to approve class settlements that result in a "net
loss" for any class member); § 1714 (prohibiting discrimination in class settlements based upon
geographic location of class members); and § 1715 (requiring notice to federal and state offi-
cials regarding certain class actions).
163 See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2062, 108th Cong. § 4 (2004); Class
Action Fairness Act of 2003, S. 1751, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003); S. 274, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003);
Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1712, 107th Cong. § 4 (2001); Class Action Fairness Act
of 1988, S. 2083, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998); Class Action Fairness Act of 1999, S. 353, 106th
Cong. § 3 (1999).
lb4 See, e.g., Editorial, Legal Extortion Series, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 17, 2003, at
14A ("Contrary to the trial lawyers' propaganda, class action abuse is a serious national problem
that calls for congressional action. The big multistate cases should be directed to federal court,
but Congress should take care that it doesn't trample the rights of consumers along the way.");
see Juliet Eilperin, Curbs on Class Action Lawsuits Urged, WASH. POST, June 12, 2003, at A6;
Michael S. Gerber, Champions of Class Action Reform Seek Senate Supermajority for Bill, THE
HILL, April 23, 2003, available at http://www.hillnews.com/business/042303-supernajority.
aspx; Wendy McElroy, Jackpot Justice, the Wal-Mart Case (June 30, 2004),
http://www.foxnews.comlstory/0,2933,124197,00.htnl (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) (discussing
the reasons class action lawsuits have become so prominent recently). Academics have partici-
pated in the debate by offering similar criticisms. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Susan P.
Koniak, Op-ed, Rule of Law: The Latest Class Action Scam, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1995, at 11
(using several case examples to support the proposition that class action reform is needed to
prevent the problems of misrepresenting consumers, multiplying and overlapping class actions,
and collusive class action settlements spurred on by the ability to forum-shop class actions to
friendly state courts); see also Debra Lyn Bassett, When Reform Is Not Enough: Assuring More
than Merely "Adequate" Representation in Class Actions, 38 GA. L. REv. 927, 929 (2004)
(discussing criticisms by academics of the current class action model); James M. Underwood,
Rationality, Multiplicity & Legitimacy: Federalization of the Interstate Class Action, 46 S. TEx.
L. REv. 391, 448-60 (2004) (explaining that federal diversity reform to permit interstate class
actions to be removed to federal courts is the only mechanism available to fix the problems with
class actions).
165The final vote in the Senate was 72 to 26. See, e.g., GovTrack.us: Independently Track-
ing the U.S. Congress, 109th U.S. Congress (2005-2006) S.5:Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sl09-5 (last visited June 8, 2006); U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Hails Senate Passage of Class Action Reform Calls on House
To "Finish the Job," http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2005/february/05-22.htm (Feb.
10, 2005).
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diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framers of the United
States Constitution, in that State and local courts are-
(A) keeping cases of national importance out of Fed-
eral court;
(B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias
against out-of-State defendants; and
(C) making judgments that impose their view of the
law on other States and bind the rights of the resi-
dents of those States.166
Although CAFA has several components, 67 the most dramatic im-
pact of this statute will be its liberalization of the federal diversity
requirements for class action cases. Section 1332(d)(2) now states
that the federal "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $5,000,000 ... and is a class action in which (A) any mem-
ber of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant... ,,168 This revision to the diversity statute changed the
diversity analysis for class actions in two distinct ways. First, it ex-
pressly provided for minimal diversity rather than the complete diver-
sity stated implicitly by § 1332(a)(1).1 69 Although the Supreme Court
had long held in class actions that the complete diversity requirement
was analyzed by looking solely to the named plaintiff class represen-
tatives and ignoring the citizenship of the unnamed class members,
70
the complete diversity requirement still precluded any class action
filed in state court from being removed if any one of the class repre-
sentatives shared their state of citizenship with any one of the named
defendants. Second, the Supreme Court had always applied
§ 1332(a)'s amount-in-controversy requirement in a harsh manner to
class actions. The Court had held that the minimum amount could not
166See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §2(a)(4), S. Res. 5, 109th Cong. (2005)
(enacted).
167 See id.
M 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 2006).
169See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (holding that each plaintiff
must be from a different state from every defendant for diversity jurisdiction), overruled in part
by Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844) (dealing with the
citizenship of corporations).170 See Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366-67 (1921), rev'd on other
grounds, Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins., 314 U.S. 118, 151 (1941), superseded by statute, Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, as recognized in Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
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be satisfied through group aggregation of the total value of the class
action, 17 ' and had similarly found that § 1332 was not satisfied unless
every single member of a putative class action independently pos-
sessed a claim in excess of the statutory minimum.172 CAFA changes
this analysis by altering the focus to the aggregate value of the entire
class claim and imposing a minimum requirement of $5 million. 173
These two changes open the doors to many more state-law class ac-
tions being capable of federal court adjudication. 74
By loosening both the diversity and amount-in-controversy re-
quirements otherwise applicable to class actions, in enacting CAFA
Congress clearly exercised a greater piece of the constitutional grant
of diversity jurisdiction than it had previously done. While Congress'
official explanation for its motives was multi-faceted and did include
an express concern with avoiding local bias, 175 its actions suggest that
local bias was not the real focus behind CAFA. For example, unlike
other diversity removals, CAFA does not prohibit removals when the
case is filed in the home state of any of the defendants. 176 Another
scholar has recognized this dichotomy behind the stated purpose for
CAFA and its actual operations:
[S]ome of the most important aspects of [CAFA] have no ap-
parent link to the desire to protect out-of-state defendants or
businesses from the impact of local bias. In particular, the Act
makes no effort to modify the general definition of corporate
citizenship for diversity purposes as including both the state
of incorporation and the state of the corporation's principal
place of business, nor does it confine its removal authoriza-
tion to out-of-state corporations or class members who might
be thought to be subject to local bias. 177
171 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
172 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), superceded by statute as recog-
nized in Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311 (1981).
17328 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
174 As the Supreme Court noted in its supplemental jurisdiction opinion, there are now two
different diversity jurisdiction doors at the federal courthouse. One may either satisfy §
1332(d)'s requirements (i.e., minimal diversity between any class member and any defendant
with an aggregate damage claim of greater than $5 million) or § 1332(a) (i.e., complete diversity
between all named class representatives and all named defendants and with each class member
having a claim in excess of $75,000). See Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S. Ct.
2611, 2627-28 (2005).
17 5 See supra text accompanying note 166.
176 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (general diversity cases shall be "removable only if none
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought") with § 1453(b) ("A class action may be removed ... without
regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought... .
177 Floyd, supra note 144, at 630.
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The impact of CAFA will be enormous, particularly in opening the
federal courthouse to the adjudication of so-called "negative value"' 178
consumer-oriented cases involving small claims for economic losses.
Due to the relative small economic losses of each class member, these
cases are very difficult to get into federal court under the traditional
amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1332 because each class
member will not typically have a large enough claim. 179 Yet these
seem to be the category of cases Congress was most interested in pro-
tecting because the individual class members have little incentive to
give oversight to class counsel's actions; but-for class certification
these claims would not otherwise likely even be pursued, and such
cases have often given rise to the notorious coupon settlements of
questionable benefit to the consumers. Indeed, it is about such types
of claims that even consumer rights advocates have criticized the
class action system as "just another milking of the system by profes-
sionals, in this case lawyers."'' 80 These cases also, arguably, offer the
strongest argument for national uniformity in terms of the impact of
the litigation on the nationwide business practices of the defen-
dants.' 81 In other words, such nationwide class actions argued
strongly for adjudication by a forum with a national focus and per-
spective. 8 2 While such national protection of interstate business is
sometimes cited as an alternative historic purpose behind the Article
III diversity grant, 183 it clearly is distinct from any local bias concerns.
Between the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon in 2005 and Con-
gress' enactment of both the Multiparty, Multiforum Act and the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, the last three years have seen an
unprecedented and historic expansion of diversity jurisdiction. Of
course, that is the prerogative of Congress since that body "controls
federal jurisdiction and can expand it or retract it, within constitu-
tional limits, as it chooses to do so.' 't84 The irony is that this expan-
sion came on the heels of what to many must have appeared to be the
178 This is a phrase used to describe claims that are, individually, so small that they would
likely result in an economic loss, balancing the expenses of litigation against the likely verdict.
See, e.g., Castano v. The American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The most
compelling rationale for finding superiority in a class action-the existence of a negative value
suit-is missing in this case.").
179 See supra text accompanying note 174.
I0Martha Neil, New Route for Class Actions, A.B.A. J., July 2003, at 48, 50 (quoting
Lawrence W. Schonbrun).
"I8 See generally Underwood, supra note 164, at 405-08 (referring to the concept of lo-
cally elected state court judges issuing orders to foreign corporations on how to treat other
foreign consumers in their out-of-state business transactions as "irrational federalism").
12Id.
183 See supra note 19.
184 Howard P. Fink, Supplemental Jurisdiction-Take It to the Limit!, 74 IND. L.J. 161, 164
(1998).
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death knell for diversity-the 1990 recommendation of the Study
Committee to abolish this least favored form of jurisdiction.
D. Footsteps at the Door?
Although diversity has continued to have many detractors among
the bench and academia, 85 diversity retains strong support among
lawyers in private practice 186 and, apparently, the majority of Con-
gress. Perhaps this is because those in the trenches tend to agree that
local bias is still a problem in the state courts. 187 Yet the diversity
debate should no longer be restricted to considerations of local bias
even though its detractors would like for such focus to frame the is-
sues. For example, Professor Chemerinsky states that the debate over
diversity jurisdiction "centers on whether state courts are likely to be
biased against out-of-staters."'' 88 Others, despite the experience of the
last few years, agree with Professor Chemerinsky and continue to try
to urge diversity's abolition based upon the opinion that local bias is
no longer a concern:
The continuing viability of diversity jurisdiction has rested
primarily on the notion of avoiding local bias .... As a form
of discrimination, local bias cannot serve as the basis for the
continuing use of diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Ar-
185 See Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: "Neither Out Far
Nor in Deep," 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 765 (1995) ("The debate over the advisability of
diversity jurisdiction goes back to its inception and shows no sign of abating in the future. The
contemporary debate is highly relevant to the future of the federal courts. The parties to the
debate generally have chosen sides so that state and federal judges and academics favor aboli-
tion while the practicing lawyers favor retention.").
186 Professor Wright states his belief that "the basis for [attorneys'] position is not that they
love the state courts less but that they love a choice of forum more." Charles Alan Wright,
Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute Proposals, 26 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 185, 207 (1969); see also William E. Betz, For the Retention of Diversity Jurisdiction,
N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1984, at 35 (arguing that a perception of continued bias at the state court
level provides continued justification for diversity jurisdiction); Adrienne J. Marsh, Diversity
Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 197, 208-09
(1982).
187 One study in Cook County, Illinois found that 40% of the attorneys surveyed who had
filed diversity cases pointed to "bias against an out-of-state resident" as a reason for their choice
of the federal forum, Jerry Goldman & Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local
Bias: A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL. STUD. 93, 97-99 (1980), while another
study found more than 60% of the attorneys believing that prejudice against non-residents
existed in some cases, Note, The Choice Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in
Virginia, 51 VA. L. REV. 178 (1965). Professor Wright also reported that a poll of practitioners
showed that they opposed any elimination of diversity jurisdiction by a 69% to 26% margin.
WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 152 n.54 (citing Law Poll, 66 A.B.A. J. 148, 149 (1980)). But cf.
Kristin Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and Implications for
Reform, 15 LAW & SOc'Y. REV. 749, 752 (1981) (finding that the perception of unfairness
seemed to predominate in rural areas only).
188 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 290.
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ticle calls for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction under
those circumstances traditionally justified on the basis of pro-
tecting nonresidents from local bias. 89
Of course, by limiting supporters of diversity jurisdiction to reliance
upon the goal of avoiding local bias, opponents can not only check
any growth in the use of diversity jurisdiction but can argue with
some success for its abolition. However, if we are to learn anything
from the recent actions of Congress, particularly in enacting the
Multi-Forum, Multi-Party Act and the Class Action Fairness Act, it
ought to be that the focus of the debate no longer is properly limited
to consideration of the possible bias against litigants. Indeed, Profes-
sor Wright's words seem to capture the impact of the changed times
on this debate well:
The conditions that existed, or were feared to exist, in 1789
are irrelevant in determining the continued necessity for di-
versity jurisdiction. As the protagonists in this continuing
controversy have recognized, the decision to retain or abolish
such jurisdiction today must depend on the utility of the ju-
risdiction in today's society. 90
The enactments of both § 1369 and § 1332(d) demonstrate Congress'
willingness to rely upon diversity jurisdiction for goals wholly unre-
lated to avoiding local bias. Consequently, those who would try to
force the debate into the narrow confines of concern for local bias
should no longer be successful in erecting such straw-man arguments.
The recent round of legislation resulting in this "vast expansion of
federal court jurisdiction"'191 has accomplished its broader goals
through the relaxation of either, or both, of the amount-in-controversy
and the complete diversity requirements. Are there any constitutional
189 Bassett, supra note 21, at 150. See also Suzanna Sherry, Against Diversity, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 1 (2000) which offers a similar analysis in its advocacy against such jurisdiction:
"Diversity" is a concept that has outgrown its origins and outlived its usefulness. In
the end, it is really just a code word for preferential treatment. With little analytical
basis, it was originally designed as a remedy for vague and undocumented fears of
covert discrimination. Now it has become instead an automatic haven for the lucky
few. Those who are able to benefit from it are, in fact, usually at no greater disadvan-
tage than those who cannot do so. Often the differences between them amount to lit-
tle more than happenstance. Indeed, some of those who can claim its benefits are less
likely to be victims of discrimination than some of those who are excluded from its
coverage. Outcomes should not turn on the fortuity of characteristics totally irrele-
vant to the merits.
Id at 1.
19°WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 143.
191 Floyd, supra note 144, at 695.
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limits to this type of legislation? There is no doubt that Article 1I in
no way requires there to be any minimum amount in controversy for
Congress to permit district courts to exercise any type of
constitutional subject matter jurisdiction. Article I nowhere
mentions such a limitation. In fact, the original grant by Congress of
federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts included a
minimum amount in controversy, only relatively recently removed.
Likewise, the Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that its
complete diversity rule first enunciated in the Strawbridget 92 decision
was merely an interpretation of § 1332 and not Article In. 193
Accordingly, the Supreme Court voiced its belief that Article III
requires only minimal diversity of citizenship and that any legislation
by Congress exercising such jurisdictional grant is constitutional. In
the context of considering the constitutionality of the minimal
diversity interpleader act, the Court explained the complete diversity
holding from Strawbridge as follows:
Chief Justice Marshall there purported to construe only "the
words of the act of congress," not the Constitution itself. And
in a variety of contexts this Court and the lower courts have
concluded that Article HI poses no obstacle to the legislative
extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so
long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the present case is properly in the
federal courts.
1 94
As recently as 2005, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed this view that
complete diversity is not required by the Constitution.1 95 Legal schol-
ars have consistently agreed with this view. 196 As one scholar stated
recently in the context of the Class Action Fairness Act, "the re-
192 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
193 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
19Id. at 531 (footnotes omitted).
195 Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2617 (2005) (arguing "[tihe
complete diversity requirement is not mandated by the Constitution") (citing State Farm v.
Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967)).
196See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 154 ("To have held that the Constitution requires
complete diversity would have had a debilitating effect on the interpleader act, and would have
largely precluded the possibilities of using the diversity jurisdiction as a basis for providing a
federal forum for other cases in which no state court could grant effective relief. Even those
most critical of diversity jurisdiction have recognized and supported the potentialities of
diversity for situations of the sort described, and a construction barring this use of diversity
would have been most unfortunate."); Fink, supra note 184, at 164 ("The rule of Strawbridge v.
Curtiss goes back to an early nineteenth-century decision of the United States Supreme Court,
which, later decisions of the Court make clear, was a reading by Chief Justice Marshall of a
jurisdictional statute-now 28 U.S.C. § 1332--not an interpretation of the parallel language of
Article I1.").
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quirement of complete diversity comes from Congress, not Article 1H.
Congress may authorize 'minimal diversity' suits in federal court and
did so [in 2005] with class actions."' 197
A somewhat isolated dissenting scholar maintains, however, that
any grant by Congress of minimal diversity jurisdiction to the district
courts must be tied to a clearly expressed desire by Congress that is
"necessary and proper" to achieving the goal of avoiding local bias
against nonresident litigants-the chief motivation of the founding
fathers in authorizing diversity jurisdiction.198 Professor Floyd, while
being alone thus far in this regard, has espoused such a proposed
limitation upon Congress in apparent reaction to Congress' recent
legislation. For Professor Floyd, Congress' failure to link its recent
legislation to a primary goal of avoiding local bias results in those
statutes being unconstitutional:
[S]ome of these concerns may, in appropriate circumstances,
provide an appropriate basis for the conferral of federal diver-
sity jurisdiction. Others, such as the desire to promote judicial
economy (standing alone), the large size of the litigation, or
the alleged incompetence of state courts to handle large scale
class action litigation, are not, without more, sufficient to
warrant the massive transfer of power from the state to the
federal judiciaries that the Act seeks to effect. The core of the
problem lies in the failure of the Act to tailor its jurisdictional
provisions to the purposes underlying Article Ill's grant of
diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts. 199
Nevertheless, the only constitutionally logical limitation that ap-
plies in a world where Congress chooses to vigorously exercise
minimal diversity jurisdiction would be that the additional parties'
claims relate enough to the claims of the diverse parties that they
form part of the same constitutional "case," as envisioned by the Su-
preme Court in Gibbs.2°° Thus, hypothetical legislation creating
minimal diversity jurisdiction in cases where the parties' claims do
197 Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The Improper Party Problem
in Removal Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REv. 779, 785 (2006). See also Linda S. Mulenix, Com-
plex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 169, 184 (1990) ("Any
objection to a minimal diversity provision [in the context of mass tort jurisdiction reform] is
easily answered by reference to the Supreme Court's affirmation of the minimal diversity-based
interpleader statute.").
'98See Floyd, supra note 144, at 634-35.
199Id. at 631.
2
"United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (stating that all claims that derive
from a "common nucleus of operative fact" shall be deemed part of the same constitutional
case).
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not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, and thus do not
form what Article III envisions to be part of the same "case," would
arguably be impermissible. However, because both § 1369 and
§ 1332(d) apply in circumstances where there would almost necessar-
ily be such a close relationship among the various parties to constitute
such a "case,"' 0' it seems implausible that the Supreme Court would
find Congress to have overstepped its broad discretion in opening the
doors to the federal courthouse.
Accordingly, regardless of the original intentions of the framers in
drafting Article III or of the first Congress in enacting the Judiciary
Act of 1789, the question to ask today is not so much about constitu-
tional limits on Congress but about issues of public policy and
whether diversity jurisdiction continues to serve any existing purpose.
As one scholar observed: "Issues of federal court versus state court
jurisdiction are best understood to be issues of power. The demarca-
tion of federal court jurisdiction is given over to the Congress. Fed-
eral jurisdiction is not law. It is politics. '20 2 At least from Congress'
perspective, which is the sole gate-keeper in terms of the jurisdiction
of the "inferior" federal courts, diversity not only is still important but
increasingly so-and this belief is held by a rather large majority.20 3
One cannot help but wonder if Justice Scalia's invitation in Finley for
Congress to legislate in the field of supplemental jurisdiction, with its
implicit recognition that Congress is the ultimate monarch in terms of
setting the boundaries for the federal district courts' jurisdictional
reach 420 4 has helped to usher in this seeming new golden era for diver-
sity jurisdiction.
Prior to 2002, some advocated "changes that would open the door
of the federal courts to virtually all mass tort, mass disaster, and ma-
201 Section 1369 will only apply in instances where there have been deaths caused by at
least seventy-five people arising out of one "single accident.. .at a discrete location." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1369(a) (Supp. 2002). Such limitations would certainly appear to limit the statute's application
to cases that arose out of the same occurrence. Likewise, the various definitional limitations
contained within Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b) would also seem to help limit the exercise of
minimal diversity in class actions to instances where the joinder of the various claims would
seem to satisfy a constitutional "case."
M' Baker, supra note 185, at 744 (citing Gene R. Nichol, Is There a Law of Federal
Courts?, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 147, 152 (1993)).203 See discussion supra note 167.
204 This attitude is consistent with the Supreme Court's historic views on the matter:
[Tlhe judicial power of the United States... is... dependent for its distribution and
organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress,
who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court).
• .and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive,
and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which
to Congress may seem proper for the public good.
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973).
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jor class actions, where they can best be handled. 2 °5 Congress has
now already adopted examples of such legislation. What other
changes, if any, may Congress consider that would be consistent with
the foregoing expansion? Other possible areas where Congress might
consider flexing its diversity muscles a bit more could include the
following:
* Loosening some of the removal limitations such as the
court-mandated requirement of unanimity, as well as the 1988
revision imposing a one-year limit on diversity removals, as
these serve to encourage the fraudulent joinder of local
citizens.2°
e Revising the removal statutes to liberalize, or at least to
streamline, the analysis for considering allegations of fraudu-
lent joinder or procedural misjoinder.2 °7
* Removing the complete diversity requirement that the Su-
preme Court read into § 1332 or, in the alternative, removing
the complete diversity requirement only for cases of extraor-
dinarily large size (i.e., over $1 million in damages) or for
certain claims such as product liability lawsuits involving
products used or sold in interstate commerce, where uniform-
ity is particularly important.20
8
* Redefining the citizenship of a corporation to be either the
state of incorporation or the principal place of business-
rather than both-and permitting removal whenever either
state of citizenship would create the diversity needed.
e Granting the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction
over certain diversity claims. While this may seem extreme,
205 Fink, supra note 184, at 163.
206See generally Haiber, supra note 15 (arguing for rejection of court-created barriers to
litigants' broad exercise of diversity removal rights).
2w See generally Underwood, supra note 38 (advocating for possible congressional legisla-
tion to at least unify the fraudulent joinder analysis); Hines & Gensler, supra note 197 (advocat-
ing for formal recognition, and possible congressional legislation, of procedural misjoinder as
an exception to the complete diversity requirement of § 1332).
2m "Even Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote the Court's opinion in Strawbridge, later ex-
pressed some serious doubts and regret about the case. What hold should this decision, rendered
in a far different era, continue to have upon us today?" Fink, supra note 184, at 164.
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there appears to be nothing in the Constitution that would
prohibit it and another prominent scholar believes Congress
has the power to "go even farther and grant such jurisdiction
[over mass-tort cases with minimal diversity] exclusively to
the federal courts-as it has done in patent and copyright
cases."
2°9
This article will not attempt to advocate for any such legislative
changes by Congress to the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Such debates can best be left to another time. Nevertheless,
what is significant about the experience of the last few years is that
Congress not only possesses the power to make such radical shifts in
the federal courts' diversity powers21° but that Congress has now be-
gun to exercise that power in significant ways. Such actions will have
a profound impact on whether, and how, certain claims continue to be
litigated in this country and should likewise impact the nature of the
debate over the continued vitality of diversity jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress appears to have recently adopted the notion that the best
litigation reforms are tied to the identity and location of the court and
to the related objective of minimizing redundant litigation. This ar-
gues for an increased role for diversity jurisdiction, at least in the case
of certain types of claims where policymakers believe a national re-
sponse is effective. Faced with the choice of accepting the Study
Committee's recommendation of abandoning diversity jurisdiction,
Congress has instead embarked on a very different path, apparently
intent upon pulling diversity out of the academic and judicial dog-
house and more fully exercising its Article II power to open the
doors to the federal courts. Such conduct is constitutional and likely
to lead to dramatic changes in the way important interstate disputes
are resolved. It is time for the legal community to wake up to these
changes.
w9Id. at 167.
210 As Professor Fink noted with regard to Congress' legislative powers in the area of
§ 1367, "[slupplemental jurisdiction is the unused weapon in Congress' arsenal to solve national
litigation problems in the federal courts." Id. at 169.
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